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C

urrent justifications of liberal education usually take one of two tacks:
itemizing the applicable skills that students derive from a liberal education,
or asserting that it is liberal education that society must look to for the
capacity for community or citizenship. The former is an argument probably worth
making because it appeals to the preoccupations of students, parents, and
employers, but it is the second that reveals the relevance, for our time, of liberal
education. Bruce Kimball argues that this latter focus on the virtues instilled by
education de-emphasizes rational inquiry and the individual pursuit of truth in what
he calls the uphilosophical" tradition in liberal education and reasserts the
urhetorical" tradition, which with its sources in classical rhetoric and Christian
humanism emphasizes the cultivation of the powers of persuasion and civic skills
and virtues (6). This identification of two traditions in liberal education provides one
context for understanding the academic preoccupations of recent decades: the
possibly futile and potentially oppressive nature of rational inquiry; the challenges
to values and beliefs posed by cultural, ethnic, and national identity; and the fact
that the academy is now the most influential institutional conveyer of values.
From another perspective, it appears that this recent urgency to define and
instill values through education challenges liberal education in both the rational,
philosophical tradition and the rhetorical tradition: it challenges the philosophical
tradition to reclaim the fundamental connection between truth and values, and it
challenges the rhetorical to center its precepts in commonly accessible
understanding. Like the latest generation in an ancestral home, in taking up the
cause of liberal education we adaptto and renovate an earlier architecture to suit our
needs and aspirations: preoccupied with the divisions and tensions among groups
and individuals and doubting enlightenment models of rationality, we seek in liberal
education the equilibrium between commitment and empathy on the one hand and
the critical habit of mind on the other. William Cronon's uOnly Connect': The Goals
of a Liberal Education" is a recent, compelling statement of the characteristics of
liberally educated people that joins intellectual acuity and general knowledge with
such characteristics as humility, tolerance, and an ability to empower others:
uEducation for human freedom is also education for human community. The two
cannot exist without each other. Each of the qualities I have described is a craft or
a skill or a way of being in the world that frees us to act with greater knowledge or
power. But each of these qualities also makes us ever more aware of the
connections we have with other people and the rest of creation .... " (79). Parker
Palmer, who delivered an influential address atthe 1987 AAHE conference entitled
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"Campus Values: From Competition and Individualism to Cooperation and
Community," and another at the 1999 conference of the same organization,
"Education as Resistance: The Fate of Values in Hazardous Times," is another
eloquent voice urgi ng that higher education renew its commitment to the cultivation
of social and personal values. Although one persistent definition of a liberally
educated citizenry has been the possession of the knowledge and critical skills to
make good judgements in a democratic setting, Cronon, Parker, and others posit
broad benefits of liberal education that encompass the heart and soul as well as the
mind.
The many essays published in the Forum for Honors in the late eighties and
nineties-when I edited this journal-span the theoretical and practical issues that
confront honors educators in the liberal arts. Among these, a core of essays explore
the equilibrium between values and rational understanding in an academic setting
from the vantage of both theory and practice, exploring questions about the
ultimate goals of learning (most famously engaged by Allan Bloom), teaching and
learning-especially collaborative learning models grounded in theories of the
social construction of knowledge, the relationship between epistemology and
academic disciplines and community, the canon, the promise and threat of
technology, and education's contribution to democratic processes. Eva Brann has
described much of the theorizing about liberal education as "flabby beyond
bearing," and she asserts that "liberal education has its concrete seat in
institutional communities, and it is they, severally, who have to achieve a brisk,
clear, persuasive language about themselves" (175). These authors, although they
represent a variety of colleges and universities, constitute such a community,
defined by high academic aspirations for students and a commitment to the
connections between theory and educational practice, and among their diverse
voices and subjects is a common drive to mediate between the claims of truths and
the claims of commitments.
In "On Being a Partial Bloomer," Jim Hill isolates the central theme of The
Closing of the American Mind: "There are in each of us two fundamental needs,
best expressed as polar opposites since they are often in conflict: the need to be
rational versus the need to be passionately committed to something or other." Hill
observes that Bloom recognizes that, as "schools of thought," these two impulses
have given rise to an array of polarities: "detachment versus commitment,
objectivity versus subjectivity, ... individual rights versus the common good, liberal
tolerance versus the sacred roots of the community" and so on. And he goes on to
assert that Bloom attempts to mediate between a respect for "both the need to be
rational and the need to belong" (22-23). Responding to Jim Hill, G. Hewett Joiner
observes that Bloom's adherence to Enlightenment rationality (as opposed to
passionate commitment) is rather more dogmatic than Hill would have us believe
(29). Nevertheless, the polarities that Hill identifies as emerging from the tension
between these two ufundamental needs," and Bloom's perhaps debatable desire to
find a resolution of these conflicts, can be seen as keys to the studies of teaching,
learning, and theory in these pages of the Forum. The degree to which our
knowledge is objective or contingent, the extent to which our ways of knowing carry
values and have implications for our ability to sustain community, and the role of
education in sustaining a democratic society are issues that underlie the ways in
which we structure our classes and programs, imagine new ways to prepare our
SPRING/SUMMER 2000
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students for their responsibilities as citizens and community members, and define
our roles as educators.
It is important to note that members of NCHC and Forum contributors have
made significant contributions to the national discussion of academic programs
with theoretical underpinnings in the premise that knowledge is socially constructed
and that learning takes place in knowledge communities. Specifically, Honors
Semesters have been the occasion for the exploration of the theoretical issue of the
social dimension of learning, and models for structuring classes and activities to
exploit this connection. In a special issue of the Forum devoted to Honors
Semesters, Bernice Braid, organizer and primary theoretician of Honors Semesters,
describes their uunderlying reflexivity"-students ucome to see themselves, in some
fashion, as another one of the texts-in-context that their program provokes them to
examine" (15). Transported to locations where they confront their own
preconceptions, students come to recognize the knowledge contexts from which
they emerged and to which they contribute: uAs Semesters participants confront
themselves-as-viewers, and reread their own writing, in itself illustrative of just how
movable a feast human interaction is, they inch toward seeing themselves as
members of an interpretive community" (16). In the words of a Semesters
participant, they undergo a "'transformation from a group of scholars to a
community of persons'" (16).
From the perspective of theories of group development and models of
experiential learning, Faith Gabelnick, coauthor Learning Communities: Creating
Connections Among Students (1990), comes also to the conclusion that Ua vibrant
Honors Semester and any learning community honor those differences, those
challenges, and help them to find a voice" (25). Yet the momentum of the
Semesters, and the clear focus of Braid's analysis of the learning process for
students who participate in them, is that this process of udecontextualizing and
recontextualizing" in the end generates, within these small communities of learners,
common meanings. In Braid's words, UMany eyes and ears sharing impressions can
construct meaningful interpretations that are consensually acceptable" (17). In
contrast to the uBlooming" polarities cited by Hill, Braid demonstrates that, through
painstaking practice, examined subjectivities can lead to mutual understandings,
integrating both experience and values.
In a passionate and sometimes recondite essay, On the Image and Essence of
Honors: Student, Professor, Program, David Patterson focuses sharply on the
definition of the individual student's learning, and seems when compared to Braid
and others to occupy the opposite pole with respect to the definition of knowledge
and learning. Defining education as uan embrace of the highest and dearest, not
only in higher education but in life as well" (4), he clearly is an exemplar of the
philosophical strain in liberal education. Inspired by Kierkegaard, Buber, and
others, Patterson asserts that the essence of learning is, significantly, not simply the
search for truth, but, in Kierkegaard's words, "'being the truth'" (6). This quest for
truth is relational: uThe urgency that characterizes the honors student's learning
process arises from a quest not only to understand something about the world but
about oneself in relation to the world. The truth of the world and the truth of the soul
are of a piece; deciding something about art, history, or physics, we decide
something about ourselves" (5).
Like Braid, Patterson sees education as a process of self-recognition and
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becoming, of attaining value through knowledge. However, the context here is
transcendent, and the ultimate goal is unabashedly spiritual rather than social.
Citing Buber's identification of education as a surrender to the "primal potential
might'" of the child, Patterson asserts, "As an embrace of this 'primal potential
might,' education is tied to the very foundations of meaning in human life. Its
purpose lies not in getting more out of life but in imparting more to life; its object is
not to acquire knowledge for its own sake but to engender a life examined and
intensified by the light of knowledge" (8). Braid sees the process of the Honors
Semester as an interaction of texts-in-progress, with increasingly subtle
approximations of meaning embedded in community; for Patterson, the always yetto-be-final process of defining the self in relation to knowledge points to an essential
being that transcends the specifics of location and time. The courses and academic
programs implied in these two perspectives are strikingly different. Braid assumes
a group of students interacting with each other; Patterson a student and teacher in
dialogue. But both bring subtlety to the dichotomy between openness and truth.
This dichotomy also shapes the arguments of the Forum authors who address
the personal and social values which education serves. For example, William
Daniel-invoking Alasdair Mcintyre's description of the evolution of social virtues
from social definition, through qualities that contribute to the good of a life, to
incorporation within a social tradition--draws a connection between the structure
of Honors Semesters and the virtues that they cultivate in participants. He observes
that on college campuses and even in most honors programs where the creation of
a community of scholars is a goal, "the primary orientation is on individual
achievement in a competitive atmosphere. Thus the virtues that emerge are those
based upon standards that emphasize comparative individual excellence within the
peer group." But in Honors Semesters, "while individual talent is recognized by
semester students, it is those shared experiences and tasks that provide definition
and meaning to their efforts" (8). On the other hand, Ted Humphrey, in an essay
entitled "Educating in and for Democracy," attempts more directly to mediate
between the claims of the individual and the group in defining the goals of
education. Indeed, he asserts that democracy is defined by a balance between
"personal and collective completion." He argues that it is to our peril that in defining
our values the metaphysical and moral are separated; on the contrary, values
emerge through an interplay between the factual and conditional on the one hand,
and the ideal on the other: "The concomitant goals of education must be diversity
and harmony. Both are necessary conditions for being able to conduct and enjoy
life. But they always exist only in dynamic tension. For diversity without harmony
is cacophonous; and harmony without diversity is tuneless. If we fail to understand
the necessary connection between each person's right to actualize her unique
potential, and the foundation that social harmony provides for such pursuit, we will
see diversity and harmony as conflicting" (11).
It is interesting, given the strong involvement of many honors faculty and
programs in learning communities and collaborative learning models, that the
Forum contributors who responded to the call for papers on "education and social
equity" raise serious concerns about the values implicit in multiculturalism, a
"philosophy" that ultimately places knowledge and meaning within the context of
groups defined by circumstances oftime and place. In their view, "multiculturalism"
as it is popularly received is not sufficient to mediate between local identities and
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fundamental human values. David Patterson, again citing Martin Buber, asserts
that multiculturalism is fundamentally anti-communal. He observes that social
equity is merely a transitional goal, but it should not be confused with true freedom;
that a political or cultural group falls short of a Utranscendent center" that is by
definition beyond the interest of any individual group. He summarizes, uThe
uniqueness of the group as a group, on the other hand, undermines the singularity
of the individual. ... Rather than place its accent on the yet-to-be of what I might
become, the politically correct curriculum derives its value from what has already
been established, from what is given beforehand: race, gender, ethnic origin"
(UPolitically Correct" 22). Similarly, Hugh Mercer Curtler, who carefully
distinguishes between the fact of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism as a
formulation of cultural and social values, argues that multiculturalism separates
cultures and people. He further argues that education should seek human freedom,
not the freedom of individual groups, and that this freedom is attained through a
recognition of commonality: uWe can survive our current crisis only by recalling
what the academy can do that no other social institution can do, and that is to free
young minds from the captivity of impulse, passion, preoccupation with self, and
ideological myopia" (7-8). Certainly the latter is the goal of most programs in the
liberal arts; the controversy, however, revolves around the group as the locus for
constructed meanings as opposed to the individual. As John Wilson points out in his
Forum essay, uLoaded Canons: The Battle for Culture in the University," the debate
about multiculturalism is not about the '1urniture of the mind" but about Uthe
discipline of the mind"; it is a debate about truth versus openness and relativism
(13). But he goes on to argue for a pluralism in curriculum that does not lose sight
of the higher values of education: uln an age when many new students in college
receive an almost exclusively technical or pre-professional education,
multiculturalists and traditionalists may have much closer ties than they believe.
Between them, we must find the future of culture, or face the threat of universities
devoted to empty specialization and vocational training with no culture at all" (16).
In addition to the essays that address a variety of models of learning, and the
values that are implicit in educational models, yet another group of Forum essays
describe in concrete terms the ways in which an academic program can prepare
students for citizenship. And, like the more theoretical essays that I have discussed,
these articles strive for a complex understanding of the tension between the claims
of the individual and the group. Responding to recent discussions of the ueclipse of
community" and the roots for this eclipse in the objectivism and individualism of
American education, Phyllis Betts and W. Richard Janikowski argue that, while they
accept that ua strong concept of community depends on the legitimacy of subjective
epistemology," students must also be empowered to effect social change, and they
are empowered by umastery" of social issues, Uagency"-knowledge of how change
has been effected, and uvision"-an ethics based in usustained discourse about the
common good." Betts and Janikowski, making a distinction between objectivism
and uan objective state of mind, " conclude that Usubjective understanding simply
is not enough in the absence of more objective problem solving skills" (20). While
these authors locate the attainment of genuine commitment in knowledge, Mary
Stanley argues that it is only in a Uliving" setting that students can derive values from
knowledge and experience. In an essay on a project at Syracuse University
(Community Service in an Educational context), she observes that students
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themselves "appear to have neither a committed belief in a priori truths nor in the
extreme relativism of a full scale sociology of knowledge." She asks, rhetorically,
"What happens, then, if students are invited to return to the ... living communities
within which problems, hopes, and material nature invite or goad us to think?" She
reports that, when students participate in seminars that immerse them in both the
perspective of academic disciplines and the reality of decision-making in the local
community, they learn not that theory and practice are separate, but that these are
mutually influential in a dynamic process through time: "theory and practice are
everywhere in a tangle; philosophy and literary theory invite us to decenter the
narrator in all our stories and despair of any grand narrative to guide those who wish
for a more universalistic text" (27). Stanley, like Braid, finds a center in participation
in community itself.
These authors offer a map for the future of liberal education. In fact, they reflect
two of the most compelling current prescriptions for higher education. One is posed
by Bruce Kimball, who suggests that the pragmatic philosophical tradition provides
a response to the widespread dissatisfaction with an assumed duality between fact
and value, theory and practice (88). Specifically, he suggests that "certain themes
of pragmatism are now resurgent: fallibilism or anti-essentialism; the equivalent
status, if not identity, of value claims and knowledge claims; the view that inquiry
is a continuing, self-corrective process common to all persons; and the idea that
belief is dependent on the intersubjective warrant provided by a community of
inquirers" (56). The other project for liberal education is advanced by Martha
Nussbaum, who in Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal
Education argues that "Reason, in short, constructs the personality in a very deep
way, shaping its motivations as well as its logic" (29). In this regard, it is important
to observe that she offers in this important book both an elaboration of
cosmopolitanism as the cultivation of an ability to recognize and identify with
universal human traits and conditions, and a description of the incremental process
of questioning and discovery in numerous college classes-what W.B. Carnochan,
writing contra pragmatism in education, describes as "reason's narrower capacity to
make midcourse adjustments" (182). Understood with preciSion and implemented
with care, both of these prescriptions are models that resist systematization: the
cultivation of the empathic yet skeptical mind occurs through iterative processes
that do not grasp prematurely at universals.
Recently, a third group of commentators, focused primarily on academic
practice and clearly in the pragmatic tradition as described by Kimball, have
synthesized what has seemed to be a ferment of innovation in higher education in
recent decades. Robert Barr and John Tagg's vision of the ulearning paradigm,"
Robert Angelo's description and means of effecting a "campus as learning
community," and Dale Coye's gathering of the late Ernest Boyer's thoughts about
human commonalities and the principles of a "strong campus community" almost
self-evidently are contributions to the same discourse that has occupied the pages
of the Forum in recent years. However, each of these essays goes further to
recommend sweeping change in the structure and goals of education. Barr and Tagg
advocate a restructuring of institutions of higher learning around student learning
rather than teaching, with success measured not by academic credits and other
functions of time, but by student success as ascertained by outcomes assessment.
Barr and Tagg assume that classrooms structured around group efforts would be
SPRING/SUMMER 2000
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essential in this new order (16-17). Angelo underscores the crucial role of learning
communities in this uparadigm shift," where competition would be de-emphasized,
inquiry would be emphasized, and the well being of all and not the
accomplishments of individuals would be the goal. He, too, sees assessment as a
significant ulever" to move learning to the center of our work (3, 5). Coye, who
addresses the need for a more focused liberal arts curriculum, connections between
the classroom and the world beyond it, and campus community, summarizes, uA
New American College ... must be a place where responsibility and character are
taken seriously. From freshman orientation to commencement day, the institution
consciously strives to connect its members by stressing the importance of shared
values" (25).
From the perspective of the Forum essays on questions of community and
individuality, and on objectivism and its impact on social values, I find the almost
automatic prescription of learning communities embedded in the academic-at
times almost technocratic-schemes presented by Barrand Tagg, and Angelo, to be
unsettling. Collaborative learning seems to have become a device, rather than a way
of proceeding that raises in the classroom itself significant issues about how and
what we know. While Forum authors, and Kimball and Nussbaum, offer
perspectives on learning that recognize ambiguities and competing models, Barr
and Tagg and Angelo are confident in their definitions of learning. For example, Barr
and Tagg rely on Howard Gardner's formulation: ilia sufficient grasp of concepts,
principles, or skills so that one can bring them to bear on new problems and
situations, deciding in which ways one' present competencies can suffice and in
which ways one may require new skills or knowledge'" (22). Several of the authors
I have discussed would say that this begs a number of questions. Angelo, too, seems
almost complacent in his acceptance of uresearch in psychology, cognitive science,
and education" (5). Without rejecting what is to be learned from educational
research, I believe that this summary is at the least narrow in its disciplinary range
and probably not tentative enough in light of the serious and difficult questions that
relate to the definition and .,als of learning.
It is perhaps "corny" to conclude this article with reference to Dudley Wynn's
uGerontian Speaks," the first essay in the first Forum issue that I edited. Wynn, at
least a generation older than the rest of the Forum contri butors with whom I worked,
rejected the systematizing or even rationalizing of educational practice. In 1989, I
considered him a genuine but idiosyncratic voice, in that he did not value the careful
planning and reporting that was the stock in trade of the rising generation of faculty
and academic administrators. However, when I conskier the terms of these more
recent discussions of hilher education and the way in which they both elaborate on
the academic models and yet deny the questioning spirit of most of the essays that
I have summarized, I am convinced of the value of what Wynn said. In an
Emersonian vein, Wynn warns, uWhatwe in the honors business have to watch out
for is that we will be wooed as pillars of the system, and our function as critical
evaluators of that system and of all values in general will be played down and even
forgotten" (7). It seems to me that the questions that Forum authors and others have
raised about community, knowledge, and education have become in the larger
forum formulaic, bereft of their recognition of values maintained in a bewildering
process of learniOi and understanding. Nevertheless, I remain confident of the
subversive aspect of those who continue to think and write precisely and
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passionately about education, and I believe that they can continue to question and
bring new perspective to what seem to be received opinions about our work. In
Dudley Wynn's words: "Studies, Programs, and systems will not and cannot go very
far in easing our sense of the loss of community. Studies, programs, and systems
will never provide the solutions to the paradoxical inner anxieties and uncertainties
in our era of illusory material comfort and, for a relatively few at the top, increasing
affluence" (5).
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